> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.pearlswap.ai/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.pearlswap.ai/how-it-works/trust.md).

# Who can do what

The threat model, stated plainly, including the assumption that cannot be engineered away.

The useful question is not whether something is safe, but who would have to do what.

| Scenario                                    | Funds at risk         | Why                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |
| ------------------------------------------- | --------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Our API or relay compromised                | **No**                | It holds no keys and decides nothing. Deposit addresses are derived and verified in your browser; withdrawal destinations come from your signature. A malicious relay can delay a message, not redirect money.                  |
| Our website's code replaced                 | **Only new payments** | A hostile page can mislead someone who has not yet paid, as with any web application. Escrowed funds are untouched, deposit addresses are independently derivable, and your wallet shows you what you are signing.              |
| One guardian's host compromised             | **No**                | One signature is not a spend. The threshold is enforced by Pearl's consensus rules and by Hyperliquid's account rules, neither of which our software can relax.                                                                 |
| A guardian lies as proposer                 | **No**                | Its peers reproduce every payload from their own view and sign only on an exact match. A fabricated proposal gathers no signatures; the turn passes on a timeout.                                                               |
| A guardian is offline, or returns stale     | **No**                | Two is a quorum. A returning guardian rebuilds from its own node and reconciles before acting.                                                                                                                                  |
| Replay, duplication, or a crash mid-payment | **No**                | Payments are keyed by source and recorded before they are sent. No two payouts for one source can both execute: on Pearl they conflict over the same coins; on Hyperliquid a payout expires before a replacement may be signed. |
| Chain reorganisation                        | **No**                | Confirmation depth is required before release, and each guardian re-reads its own node rather than trusting a cached view.                                                                                                      |
| We are compelled, or cease to exist         | **Not by us alone**   | We are one signer of three. Our absence neither moves the reserve nor strands it.                                                                                                                                               |
| **Two guardians collude**                   | **Yes**               | The trust assumption. Two independent operators acting together can move the escrow.                                                                                                                                            |

### The assumption, stated once

Threshold custody converts a custody problem into an independence problem. It cannot remove it. The design is worth precisely what the guardians' independence is worth: different organisations, different infrastructure, different jurisdictions, different incentives. That is a matter of who they are, not of code, and we would rather say so than imply otherwise.

### What you can verify yourself

* That your deposit address is the one the guardians attested to, checked in your browser against keys pinned into the page.
* That your withdrawal destination is what your wallet displays when it asks you to sign.
* That the amount quoted is the amount delivered.
* That the escrow's rules are what we say: the Pearl output's spending conditions and the Hyperliquid account's authorised signers are both public, on-chain, and checkable without our cooperation.


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