> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.pearlswap.ai/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.pearlswap.ai/how-it-works/guardians.md).

# The guardians

What each guardian verifies before it will sign, and what it refuses.

Three operators, all three to agree on a payment, two signatures to move it, and no privileged member. Each runs the same software over its own infrastructure: its own Pearl full node, its own database, its own keys.

### Who they are

| Operator                            | Guardian     |                                                                                                        |
| ----------------------------------- | ------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| [Enderpearl](https://enderpearl.ai) | `t-mining`   | An early Pearl miner, independent. In their own words, "not part of Pearl Research Labs or Pearl Swap" |
| [Deep Nacre](https://deepnacre.com) | `mc-mining`  | An early Pearl miner, independent, holding no user keys                                                |
| [Pearl Swap](https://pearlswap.ai)  | `pearl-swap` | Us. One guardian of three, with no more say than the other two                                         |

Two of the three were mining Pearl before any of this existed, which is the point: they have their own reasons to keep the chain honest, and they had them before we asked.

Each publishes its own guardian's live state, read from its own machine rather than from ours, so the three can be compared against each other without asking us anything. Their keys are on the [key addresses](https://docs.pearlswap.ai/reference/addresses.md) page.

### Three keys, separated by purpose

| Key               | Use                                                                                                                                             |
| ----------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Pearl signing key | Its share of the escrow's script path                                                                                                           |
| Hyperliquid key   | Its share of the treasury's authorised signers                                                                                                  |
| Identity key      | Signs messages to peers and deposit-address attestations. Kept apart from the two above, so constant use never touches the keys that move funds |

### The checklist before a signature

A guardian treats every proposal as untrusted input. In order, it:

1. **Rejects anything built under a different configuration**, matched by hash. The guardian set, threshold, fees and limits are one document all three agree on; one guardian cannot quietly change a fee or a cap.
2. **Confirms the source exists, on its own node.** For a deposit: the output, its amount, its script, and enough confirmations. For a withdrawal or return: the transfer in the exchange's own ledger, with its sender and amount.
3. **Recomputes the destination from cryptography.** The Hyperliquid account committed in the deposit script, or the sender's signature bound to that one transfer — never a value supplied with the proposal.
4. **Recomputes every amount** from the agreed rules and compares.
5. **Rebuilds the payload** — the Pearl transaction or the exchange action — and compares it byte for byte with what was proposed.
6. **Checks its own history.** Has it already signed for this source? Would this conflict with something it signed before? A second payout is signed only under rules that make simultaneous execution impossible.
7. **Checks the reserve and limits.** The reserve must still cover everything circulating on Hyperliquid after the payment. If it would not, the guardian refuses; if the shortfall is still there when it looks again a minute later, it stops paying out on Hyperliquid until an operator has looked. The guardian set names no amount limits: the reserve and the 12-confirmation wait are what bound a payment. A set may still name limits of its own; a full limit then causes a retryable refusal.
8. **Writes down its intent to sign, and only then signs.**

Any step failing is a refusal with a reason, returned to the proposer and recorded. Refusals are normal: a guardian whose view lags refuses until it catches up.

### Adversarial testing

The refusal paths are tested as attacks rather than as error handling: a leading guardian that lies about amounts, destinations, sources, configuration or its own identity; attempts to have one payment made twice, under a new sequence number or a different leader; a compromised follower returning junk signatures; a guardian returning after an absence to re-propose something already settled. The suite also kills a guardian at each of the worst possible moments — holding a fully signed payment, immediately after submitting one, immediately after signing as a follower — and then requires the books to balance to the last unit.

### Liveness

Every payment needs all three guardians to agree on it before any of them signs, so one guardian being down pauses new payments until it is back. Nothing is lost while it is: a payment waits and then goes through once. A returning guardian rebuilds its view from its own node and resumes. No number of guardians being down puts escrowed funds at risk, because the two-of-three threshold is a consensus rule rather than a policy the others could relax.
